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Abstract
We present an algorithm to approximate the solutions to variational problems where set of
admissible functions consists of convex functions. The main motivator behind this numerical
method is estimating solutions to Adverse Selection problems within a Principal-Agent frame-
work. Problems such as product lines design, optimal taxation, structured derivatives design,
etc. can be studied through the scope of these models. We develop a method to estimate their
optimal pricing schedules.
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1 Introduction
Arguably, Newton’s problem of the body of minimal resistance is the original variational problem
with convexity constraints. It consists of finding the shape of a solid that encounters the least
resistance when moving through a fluid. This is equivalent to finding a convex function from a
convex domain (originally a disk) in R2 to R that minimizes a certain funtional (see section 2).
Newton’s original “solution” assumed radial symmetry. This turned out to be false, as shown by
Brock, Ferone and Kawohl in [3], which sparked new interest to the study of variational problems
with convexity constraints. One can also find these kinds of problems in finance and economics.
Starting in 1978 with the seminal paper of Mussa and Rosen [16], the study of non-linear pricing
as a means of market screening under Adverse-Selection has produced a considerable stream of
contributions ([1],[5],[17],...). In models where goods are described by a single quality and the set of
agents is differentiated by a single parameter, it is in general possible to find closed form solutions
for the pricing schedule. This is, however, not the case when multidimensional consumption
bundles and agent types are considered. Although Rochet and Chone´ [17] provided conditions
for the existence of an optimal pricing rule and fully characterized the ways in which markets
differentiate in a multidimensional setting, they also pointed out that it is only in very special
cases that one can expect to find closed form solutions. The same holds true for models where the
set of goods lies in an infinite-dimensional space, even when agent types are one-dimensional. This
framework was first used, to our knowledge, by Carlier, Ekeland and Touzi [5] to price financial
derivatives traded “over-the-counter”. It was then extended by Horst and Moreno [11] to model
the actions of a monopolist who has an initial risky position that she evaluates via a coherent risk
measure, and who intends to transfer part of her risk to a set of heterogenous agents. In both
cases the authors find that only very restrictive examples allow for explicit solutions.
Given that a great variety of problems, such as product lines design, optimal taxation, struc-
tured derivatives design, etc. can be studied through the scope of these models, there is a clear
need for robust and efficient numerical methods that approximate their optimal pricing schedules.
Note that this also provides an approximation of the optimal “products”. Most of the papers men-
tioned above eventually face solving a variational problem under convex constraints. This family
of problems have lately been studied under different scopes. Carlier and Lachand-Robert [6] have
studied the C1 regularity of minimizers when the functional is elliptic and the admissible functions
satisfy a Dirichlet-type boundary condition. Their results can be extended to of our examples.
Lachand-Robert and Pelletier [15] characterize the extreme points of a functional depending only
on ∇f over a set of convex functions with uniform convex bounds. In this paper we provide sev-
eral variants of an algorithm, based on the idea of approximating a convex function by an affine
envelope, to solve these types of problems. This deviates from previous work by Chone´ and Herve´
[8] and Carlier, Lachand-Robert and Maury [7], where the authors use finite element methods.
In the former case, a conformal (interior) method is used and a non-convergence result is given.
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As a consequence, the latter uses an exterior approximation method, which is indeed found to
be convergent in the classical projection problem in H10 . Lachand-Robert and Oudet present in
[14] and algorithm for minimizing functionals within convex bodies that shares some similarities
to ours. For a particular problem, they start with an admissible polytope and iteratively modify
the normals to the facets in order to find an approximate minimizer.
We estimate the minimizers for several problems with known, closed form solutions as a means
of comparing the output of our method to the true solutions. These are taken from [17] and [5].
Finally, we provide an example in which we approximate the solution to a risk-minimization
problem similar to the one presented in [11]. This is still based on the affine-envelope idea,
but requires some additional methodology, since it involves solving a non-standard variational
problem.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we state our problem and
provide some classical examples. Our algorithm and a proof of its convergence are presented in
Section 3. In Section 4 we show the solutions obtained via our algorithm to several problems
found in the literature. Since these problems share a common microeconomic motivation, we
include a brief discussion on the latter. The examples include the well known “Rochet-Chone´”
problem, a one dimensional example from Carlier, Ekeland and Touzi and the risk transfer case
for a principal who offers call options with type-dependent strikes and evaluates her risk via the
“short fall” of her position. This section is followed by our conclusions. Finally a section devoted
to technical results and all our codes are included in the appendix.
2 Setting
The aim of this paper is to present a numerical algorithm to approximate the solutions of some
variational problems subject to convexity constraints. A classical example of the latter is Newton’s
problem of the body of minimal resistance, which, given Θ a smooth subset of R2, consists of
minimizing
I[v] =
∫
Θ
dθ
1 + |∇v|2
,
over the set of convex functions {f : Θ→ R}. We use the following notation throughout:
• Θ, Q ⊂ Rn are convex and compact sets,
• L(θ, z, p) = z − θ · p+ C(p), where C is strictly convex and C1.
• C := {{ : Θ→ R | { ≥ ′ is convex, and ∇{ ∈ Q a.e},
• I[f ] :=
∫
Θ L(θ, f(θ),∇f(θ))dθ.
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Our objective is to (numerically) estimate the solution to
P := inf
f∈C
I[f ] (1)
We assume C is such that (1) has a unique solution (see, for example, [13]). Given the properties
of L and C we immediately have the following
Proposition 2.1 Assume v solves P, then there is θ0 in Θ such that v(θ0) = 0.
Proof. Let v0 = minθ∈Θ v(θ) (recall Θ is compact)and define u(θ) := v(θ)− v0, then
I[u] =
∫
Θ
u(θ)− θ · ∇u(θ) + C(∇u(θ))dθ = I[v]− ‖Θ‖v0.
This would contradict the hypothesis of v being a minimizer of I over C unless v0 = 0. ✷
It follows from proposition 2.1 that we can redefine C to include only functions that have a
root in Θ. This, together with the compactness of Q, implies the following proposition, which we
will use frequently.
Proposition 2.2 There exists 0 < K <∞ such that v ≤ K for all v in C.
It follows from Proposition 2.2 and the restriction on the gradients that for each choice of function
C, problem P has a unique solution, since the functional I will be strictly convex, lower semi
continuous and the admissible set is bounded (see [9]).
Remark 2.3 Our algorithm will still work with more general L’s as long as one can prove that
the family of feasible minimizers is uniformly bounded.
3 Description of the Algorithm
From this point on, whenever we use supscripts we refer to vectors. For example V k = (V k1 , . . . , V
k
m).
On the other hand a subscript indicates a function to be evaluated over some closed, convex subset
of Rk of non-empty interior, ie, {Vk} is a sequence of functions Vk : X → R for some X contained
in Rn.
Assumption 3.1 We will consider Θ = [a, b]n.
To find an approximate solution to P, we proceed as follows:
1. We discretize the domain Θ in the following way: We partition it into Σk, which consists
of kn equal cubes of volume ‖Σk‖ :=
(
b−a
k
)n
. The elements of Σk will be denoted by σ
k
j ,
1 ≤ j ≤ kn. Now define Θk as the set of centers of the σ
k
j ’s. The elements of Θk will be
denoted by θkj . The choice of a uniform partition is done for computational simplicity.
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2. We denote fi = f
(
θki
)
and associate such weight with θki .
3. We associate to each element θki of Θk a non-negative number v
k
i and an n-dimensional
vector Dki . The former represents the value of v(θ
k
i ) and the latter ∇v(θ
k
i ).
4. We solve the (non-linear) program
Pk := inf ‖Σk‖
kn∑
i=1
L (θi, vi,Di) fi (2)
over the set of all vectors of the form v = (v1, . . . , vkn) and all matrices of the form D =
(D1, . . . ,Dkn) such that:
(a) v ≥ 0 (non-negativity),
(b) Di ∈ Q for i = 1, . . . k
n (feasibility),
(c) vi − vj +Di · (θj − θi) ≤ 0 (convexity).
If the problem in hand includes Dirichlet boundary conditions these can be included here
as linear constraints that the Di’s corresponding to points on the “boundary” of Θk must
satisfy.
5. Let (vk,D
k
) be the solution to Pk. We define vk(θ) := maxi pi(θ), where
pi(θ) = v
k
i +D
k
i · (θ − θi).
6. vk yields an approximation to the minimizer of P.
Remark 3.2 The constraints of the non-linear program determine a convex set.
Remark 3.3 4 (c) guarantees that pi is a supporting hyperplane of the convex hull of the points
{(θ1, v1), . . . , (θkn , vkn)}. Note that vk is a piecewise affine convex function.
3.1 Convergence of the Algorithm
Proposition 3.4 Under the assumptions made on L, the problem Pk has a unique solution.
Proof. The function
Jk(v
k,Dk) :=
kn∑
i=1
(
θi ·D
k
i − v
k
i − C(D
k
i )
)
‖Σk‖fi
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is strictly convex. It follows from proposition 2.2 that any acceptable vector-matrix pair (vk,Dk)
must lie in [0,K]k × Qk, which together with Remark 3.2 implies Pk consists of minimizing a
strictly convex function over a compact and convex set. The result then follows from general
theory. ✷
Proposition 3.5 There exists v ∈ C such that:
1. The sequence {vk} generated by the Pk’s has a subsequence {vkj}that converges uniformly
to v.
2. limkj→∞ I[vkj ] = I[v].
Proof. The bounded (Proposition 2.2) family {vj} is uniformly equicontinuous, as it consists of
convex functions with uniformly bounded subgradients. By the Arzela-Ascoli theorem we have
that, passing to a subsequence if necessary, there is a non-negative and convex function v such
that
vk → v uniformly on Θ.
By convexity ∇vk → ∇v almost everywhere (lemma A.5); since ∇vk(θ) belongs to the bounded
set Q, the integrands are dominated. Therefore, by Lebesgue Dominated Convergence we have
lim
k→∞
I [vk] = I[v].
✷
Let u be the maximizer of I[·] within C. Our aim is to show that {vk} is a minimizing sequence
of problem P, in other words that
lim
k→∞
I [vk] = I [u] .
We need the following
Definition 3.6 Let u be such that infu∈C I[u] = I[u]. Given the lattice Θk, we define:
1. uki := u(θi),
2. Gki := ∇u(θi),
3. qi(θ) := u
k
i +G
k
i · (θ − θi) and
4. uk(θ) := supi qi(θ).
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Notice that uk(θ) is also constructed as the convex envelope of a family of affine functions.
The inequalities
Jk(u
k, Gk) ≥ Jk(v
k,D
k
) (3)
I[vk] ≥ I[u] (4)
follow from the definitions of Jk(v
k,D
k
), vk and uk, as does the following
Proposition 3.7 Let u and uk be as above, then uk → u uniformly as k →∞.
Proposition 3.8 For each k there exist ǫ1(k) and ǫ2(k) such that
∣∣∣Jk(vk,Dk)− I[vk]∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ1(k) (5)
∣∣∣Jk(uk, Gk)− I[uk]∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ2(k) (6)
and ǫ1(k), ǫ2(k)→ 0 as k →∞.
Proof. We will show (5) holds, the proof for (6) is analogous. Define the simple function
wk(θ) := L(θ
k
j , v
k
j ,D
k
j ), θ ∈ σ
k
j ,
hence
Jk(v
k,D
k
) =
∫
Θ
wk(θ)dθ. (7)
The left-hand side of (5) can be written as
∣∣∣∣
∫
Θ
wk(θ)dθ − I[vk]
∣∣∣∣ (8)
It follows from Lemma A.7 that there exists ǫ1(k), such that∣∣∣∣
∫
Θ
wk(θ)dθ − I[vk]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ1(k)
and
ǫ1(k)→ 0 k →∞.
✷
We can now prove the main theorem in this section, namely
Theorem 3.9 The sequence {vk} is minimizing for problem P.
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Proof. It follows from Proposition 3.8 and equation (3) that
I[uk] + ǫ2(k) + ǫ1(k) ≥ I[vk] ≥ I[u] (9)
Letting k →∞ in (9) and using Proposition 3.7 yields the desired result. ✷
4 Examples
In this section we show some results of implementing our algorithm. The first two examples reduce
quadratic programs, whereas the third and fourth ones are non-linear optimization programs.
All the computer coding has been written in MatLab. However, in both cases supplemental
Optimization Toolboxes were used. In the first two examples we used the Mosek 4.0 Optimization
Toolbox, wherease in the last two we used Tomlab 6.0. These four examples share a common
microeconomic motivation, for which we provide an overview. We refer the interested reader to
[2] for a comprehensive presentation of Principal-Agent models and Adverse Selection, as well as
multiple references.
4.1 Some Microeconomic Motivation
Consider an economy with a single principal and a continuum of agents. The latter’s prefer-
ences are characterized by n-dimensional vectors. These are called the agents’ types. The set
of all types will be denoted by Θ ⊂ Rn. The individual types θ are private information, but the
principal knows their statistical distribution, which has a (non-atomic) density f(θ).
Our model takes a hedonic approach to product differentiation. We assume goods are char-
acterized by (n-dimensional) vectors describing their utility-bearing attributes. The set of tech-
nologically feasible goods that the principal can deliver will be denoted by Q ⊂ Rn+, and it
will be assumed to be compact and convex. The cost to the principal of producing one unit of
product p is denoted by C(p). Products are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, each agent can
buy one or zero units of a single product p and it is assumed there is no second-hand market.
The (type-dependent) preferences of the agents are represented by the function
U : Θ×Q→ R.
The (non-linear) price schedule for the technologically feasible goods is represented by
π : Q→ R.
When purchasing good q at a price π(q) an agent of type θ has net utility
U(θ, q)− π(q)
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Each agent solves the problem
max
q∈Q
{U(θ, q)− π(q)} .
By analyzing the choice of each agent type under a given price schedule π, the principal screens
the market. Let
v(θ) := U(θ, q(θ))− π(q(θ)), (10)
where q(θ) belongs to argmaxq∈Q {U(θ, q)− π(q)} . Notice that for all q in Q we have
v(θ) ≥ U(θ, q)− π(q) (11)
Analogous to the concepts of subdifferential and convex conjugate from classical Convex
Analysis, we have that the subset of Q where (11) is an equality is called the U -subdifferential
of v at θ and v is the U -conjugate of π (see, for example, [4]). We write
v(θ) = πU (θ)
and
∂Uv(θ) := {q ∈ Q | π
U (θ) + π(q) = U(θ, q)}
To simplify notation let π(q(θ)) = π(θ). A single pair (q(θ), π(θ)) is called a contract, whereas
{(q(θ), π(θ))}θ∈Θ is called a catalogue. A catalogue is called incentive compatible if v(θ) ≥
v0(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, where v0(θ) is type’s θ non-participation (or reservation) utility. We normalize
the reservation utility of all agents to zero, and assume there is always an outside option q0
that denotes non-participation. Therefore we will only consider functions v ≥ 0. The Principal’s
aim is to devise a pricing function π : Q→ R as to maximize her income
∫
Θ
(π(θ)− C(q(θ))) f(θ)dθ (12)
Inserting (10) into (12) we get the alternate representation
∫
Θ
(U(θ, q(θ))− v(θ)− C(q(θ))) f(θ)dθ. (13)
Expression (13) is to be maximized over all pairs (v, q) such that v is U-convex and non-negative
and q(θ) ∈ ∂Uv(θ). Characterizing ∂Uv(θ) in a way that makes the problem tractable can be
quite challenging. In the case where U(θ, q(θ)) = θ · q(θ), as in [17], for a given price schedule
π : Q→ R, the maximal net utility of an agent of type θ is
v(θ) := max
q∈Q
{θ · q − π(q)} (14)
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Since v is defined as the supremium of its affine minorants, it is a convex function of the types. It
follows from the Envelope Theorem that the maximum in equation (14) is attained if q(θ) = ∇v(θ),
and we may write
v(θ) = θ · ∇v(θ)− π(∇v(θ)). (15)
The principal’s aggregate surplus is given by
∫
Θ
(π(q(θ))− C(q(θ))) f(θ)dθ. (16)
Inserting (15) into (16) we get that the principal’s objective is to maximize
I[v] :=
∫
Θ
(θ · ∇v(θ)− C(∇v(θ))− v(θ)) f(θ)dθ (17)
over the set
C := {v : Θ→ R | v convex, v ≥ 0, ∇v(θ) ∈ Q} .
4.2 The Musa-Rosen Problem in a Square
The following structures are shared in the first two examples:
• x = (vk,Dk), this structure will determine any possible candidate for a minimizer to Jk(·, ·)
in the following way: vk is a vector of length k2 that will contain the approximate values
of the optimal function v evaluated on the points of the lattice. The vector Dk has length
2 ∗ k2 and it contains what will be the partial derivatives of v at the same points
• h is a vector of length 3 ∗ k2. The product hx provides the discretization of the integral∫
Θ(θ · ∇v − v(θ))f(θ)dθ.
• B is the matrix of constraints. The inequality Bx ≤ 0 imposes the non-negativity of v and
D and the convexity of the resulting vk.
Remark 4.1 The density f(θ) is “built into” vector h and the cost function C.
Let Θ = [1, 2]2, C(q) = 12‖q‖
2, and assume the types are uniformly distributed. This is our
the benchmark problem, since the solution to the principal’s problem can be found explicitly [17].
In this case we have to solve the quadratic program
sup
x
hx−
1
2
xtHx
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subject to
Bx ≤ 0
H is a (3 ∗ k2) × (3 ∗ k2) matrix whose first k2 columns are zero, since v does not enter the cost
function; the four k2 × k2 blocks towards its lower right corner form a (2 ∗ k2)× (2 ∗ k2) identity
matrix. Therefore 12x
tHx is a discretization of
∫
Θ ‖∇v(θ)‖dθ. Figure 1(a) was produced using a
17× 17-points lattice and a uniform density, whereas Figure 2(b) shows the traded qualities.
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1.8 2
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2
(a) The optimal function v.
−0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
(b) The qualities traded.
Figure 1: Optimal solution for Uniformly distributed agent types.
4.3 The Musa-Rosen Problem with a Non-uniform Density
We keep the cost function of the previous example, but now assume the types are distributed
according to a bivariate normal distribution with mean (1.9, 1) and variance-covariance matrix
[
.3 .2
.2 .3
]
As noted before, the weight assigned to each to each agent type is built into h and H, so the
vector x remains unchanged. We obtain figure 2(a).
Remark 4.2 It is interesting to see that in this case bunching of the second kind, as described
by Roche´ and Chone´ in [17], appears to be eliminated as a consequence of the skewed distribution
of the agents. This can be seen in the non-linear level curves of the optimizing function v. This
is also quite evident in the plot of the qualities traded, which is shown below.
The MatLab programs for the two previous examples were run on MatLab 7.0.1.24704 (R14)
in a Sun Fire V480 (4×1.2 HGz Ultra III, 16 GB RAM) computer running Solaris 2.10 OS. In the
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(a) The optimal function v.
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(b) The qualities traded.
Figure 2: Optimal solution for normally distributed agent types.
first example 57.7085 seconds of processing time were required. The running time in the second
example was 81.7280 seconds.
4.4 An example with Non-quadratic Cost
In this example we approximate a solution to the problem of a principal who is selling over-the-
counter financial derivatives to a set of heterogeneous agents. This model is presented by Carlier,
Ekeland and Touzi in [5]. They start with a standard probability space (Ω,F , P ), and the types
of the agents are given by their risk aversion coefficients under the assumption of mean-variance
utilities; namely, the set of agent types is Θ = [0, 1], and the utility of an agent of type θ when
facing product X is
U(θ,X) = E[X] − θVar[X]
Under the assumptions of a zero risk-free rate and that the principal has access to a complete
market, her cost of delivering product X(θ) is given by −
√
−ξv′(θ); where ξ is the variance of
the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the (unique) martingale measure, and Var[X(θ)] = −v′(θ). The
principal’s problem can be written as
sup
v∈C
∫
Θ
(
θv′(θ) +
√
−v′(θ)− v(θ)
)
dθ (18)
where C := {v : Θ→ R | v convex, v ≥ 0, v′ ≤ 0 and Var [X(θ)] = −v′(θ)} . Figure 4.4 shows an
approximation of the maximizing v using 25 agent types.
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Figure 3: The optimal function v.
4.5 Minimizing Risk
The microeconomic motivation for this section is the model of Horst & Moreno [11]. We present
an overview for completeness. The principal’s income, which is exposed to non-hedgeable risk
factors, is represented by W ≤ 0. The latter is a bounded random variable defined on a standard,
non-atomic, probability space (Ω,F ,P) . The principal’s goal is to lay off parts of her risk with
the agents whose preferences are mean-variance. The agent types are indexed by their coefficients
of risk aversion, which are assumed to lie Θ = [a, 1] for some a > 0. The principal underwrites
call options on her income with type-dependent strikes:
X(θ) = (|W | −K(θ))+ with 0 ≤ K(θ) ≤ ‖W‖∞.
If the principal issues the catalogue {(X(θ), π(θ))}, she receives a cash amount of
∫
Θ π (θ) dθ
and is subject to the additional liability
∫
ΘX(θ)dθ. She evaluates the risk associated with her
overall position
W +
∫
Θ
(π(θ)−X(θ))dθ
via the “entropic measure” of her position, i.e.
ρ
(
W +
∫
Θ
(X(θ)− π(θ))dθ
)
where ρ(X) = logE[exp{−βX}] for some β > 0. The principal’s problem is to devise a catalogue
as to minimize her risk exposure. Namely, she chooses a function v and contracts X from the set
{(X, v) | v ∈ C, v ≤ K1, −Var[(|W | −K(θ))
+] = v′(θ), |v′| ≤ K2, 0 ≤ K(θ) ≤ ‖W‖∞},
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in order to minimize
ρ
(
W −
∫
Θ
{
(|W | − F (v′(θ)))+ − E[(|W | − F (v′(θ)))+]
}
d
)
− I(v).
where
I(v) =
∫
Θ
(
θv′(θ)− v(θ)
)
dθ.
We assume the set of states of the World is finite with cardinality m. Each possible state ωj
can occur with probability pj . The realizations of the principal’s wealth are denoted by W =
(W1, . . . ,Wm). Note that p and W are treated as known data. The objective function of our
non-linear program is
F (v, v′,K) = log

exp

−
n∑
i=1
Wipi +
1
n
n∑
i=1

 n∑
j=1
T (Kj − |Wi|)

 pi
−
1
n
n∑
i=1

 n∑
j=1
T (Kj − |Wi|)

 pi




+
1
n
∑
vi − θiv
′
i
where K = (K1, . . . ,Kn) denotes the vector of type dependent strikes. We denote by ng the total
number of constraints. The principal’s problem is to find
min
(v,v′,K)
F (v, v′,K) subject to G(v, v′,K) ≤ 0
where G : R3n → Rng determines the constraints that keep (v, v′,K) within the set of feasible
contracts. Let (1/6, 2/6, . . . , 1) be the uniformly distributed agent types, and
• W = 4 ∗ (−2,−1.7, 1.4,−.7,−.5, 0),
• P = (1/10, 1.5/10, 2.5/10, 2.5/10, 1.5/10, 1/10).
The principal’s initial evaluation of her risk is 1.52. The following are the plots for the approxi-
mating v and the strikes:
Note that for illustration purposes we have changed the scale for the agent types in the second
plot. The interpolates of the approximate to the optimal function v and the strikes are:
v1 4.196344
v2 3.234565
v3 2.321529
v4 1.523532
v5 0.745045
v6 0.010025
K1 1.078869
K2 0.785079
K3 0.733530
K4 0.713309
K5 0.713309
K6 0.713309
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(a) The optimal function v.
1 2 3 4 5 6
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
(b) The type-dependent strikes
Figure 4: Optimal solution for underwriting call options.
The Principal’s valuation of her risk after the exchanges with the agents decreases from 11.49 to
−3.56.
Remark 4.3 Notice the ”bunching” at the bottom.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a numerical algorithm to estimate the minimizers of variational
problems with convexity constraints, with our main motivation stemming from Economics and
Finance. Ours is an internal method, so at each precision level the approximate minimizers
lie within the acceptable set of functions. Our examples are developed over one or two dimen-
sional sets for illustration reasons, but the algorithm can be implemented in higher dimensions.
However, it must be mentioned that, as is the case with the other methods found in the related
literature, implementing convexity has a high computational cost which increases geometrically
with dimension.
6 Appendix
A Some technical results
In order to prove convergence of our algorithm we make use of the Convex Analysis results
contained in this section. We will work on C, an open and convex subset of Rn.
Definition A.1 A mapping F : C → P (Rm) (the power set of Rm) is said to be set valued if
for each x in C, F (x) is a non-empty subset of Rm.
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Recall that if f : C → R is a convex function, then the subdifferential of f at x, defined as
∂f(x) := {b ∈ Rn | f(y)− f(x) ≥ b · (y − x) for ally ∈ C},
is a non-empty subset of Rn for all x in C. Therefore, the set valued mapping
x→ ∂f(x)
is well defined on C. Notice that if for some x in C we have #∂f(x) = 1, then
∂f(x) = {∇f(x)}.
In such case we say the subdifferential mapping is single valued at x and we can simply
identify it with the gradient of f at x.
Definition A.2 Let F : C → Rm be a set valued function. Then we say F is differentiable
at x0 iff there is a linear mapping Lx0 : C → R
m such that for all ǫ > 0 there is δ > 0 such that
if y0 ∈ f(x0), y ∈ f(x) and ‖x− x0‖ < δ then
‖y − y0 − Lx0(x− x0)‖
‖x− x0‖
≤ ǫ
The following theorem is due to Alexandrov ( [12])
Theorem A.3 Let f : Rn → R be convex, then se set valued function ∂f is differentiable almost
everywhere.
Clearly, in the case where f is single valued, definition A.2 is equivalent to the regular definition
of a Fre´chet differentiable function. Moreover if f differentiable at x0 and we choose y0, y1 in
f(x0) and let x = x0 in definition A.2 we get
‖y0 − y1‖ ≤ 0,
which implies f is single valued at x0. It follows from Alexandrov’s Theorem and the observation
above that for almost all θ ∈ Θ, the set valued mapping θ → ∂f(θ) can be identified with the
single valued assignment θ → ∇f(θ), and we have the following
Corollary A.4 Let f : C → R be convex . Then the mapping
θ → ∇f(θ)
is well defined and continuous almost everywhere.
Proposition A.5 Let A ⊂ Rn be a convex, open set. Assume the sequence of convex functions
{fk : AtoR} converges uniformly to f¯ , then ∇fk → ∇f¯ almost everywhere on A.
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Proof. Denote by Dif the derivative of f in the direction of ei. The convexity of fk and f¯
implies the existence of a set B, with µ(A \B) = 0 such that the partial derivatives of fk and f¯
exist and are continuous in B. Let x ∈ B. To prove that Difk(x)→ Dif¯(x), consider η such that
x+ ηei ∈ A. Since fk is convex
fk(x+ hei)− fk(x)
h
≥ Difk(x) ≥
fk(x− hei)− fk(x)
h
for all 0 < h < η. Hence
fk(x+ hei)− fk(x)
h
−Dif¯(x) ≥ Difk(x)−Dif¯(x) ≥
fk(x− hei)− fk(x)
h
−Dif¯(x).
The left-hand side of this inequality is equal to
fk(x+ hei)− f¯(x+ hei)
h
+
f¯(x)− fk(x)
h
+
f¯(x+ hei)− f¯(x)
h
−Dif¯(x).
For ǫ > 0 let 0 < δ < η be such that∣∣∣∣ f¯(x+ hei)− f¯(x)h −Dif¯(x)
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ
for |h| ≤ δ. Let N ∈ N be such that
−ǫδ ≤ fn(x)− f(x) ≤ ǫδ
n ≥ N. Hence, taking h = δ, we have that for all n ≥ N,
fn(x+ he1)− f(x+ he1)
h
≤ ǫ and
f(x)− fn(x)
h
≤ ǫ.
Hence
3ǫ ≥ D1fn(x)−D1f(x)
for all x ∈ B. The same argument shows that
−3ǫ ≤ D1fn(x)−D1f(x)
for all n ≥ N and all x ∈ B, which concludes the proof. ✷
Proposition A.6 Let U ⊂ Rn be a convex, compact set and let g : U → R be a convex function
such that for all x ∈ U, the subdifferentials ∂g(x) are contained in Q for some compact set Q.
Then there exists {gj : U → R} such that gj ∈ C
1(U) and gj → g uniformly on U.
Proof. Fix δ > 0 and define
Uδ := {(1 + δ)x | x ∈ U}.
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Extend g to be defined on Uδ. Let Kǫ be a family of mollifiers (see, for instance [13]), then the
functions
hǫ := g ∗Kǫ
are convex, smooth and they converge uniformly to g on U as long as ǫ is small enough so that
Uǫ := {x ∈ Uδ | d(x, ∂Uδ) > ǫ}
is contained in U. Let n ∈ N be such that U1/n ⊂ U, then the sequence {gj := h1/j} has the
required properties. ✷
Lemma A.7 Consider φ(θ, z, p) ∈ C1 (Θ× R×Q→ R) , where Θ = [a, b]n and Q is a compact
convex subset of Rn. Let {fk : Θ→ R} be a family of convex functions such that ∂fK(θ) ⊂ Q for
all θ ∈ Θ, and whose uniform limit is f. Let Σk be the uniform partition of Θ consisting of k
n
cubes of volume ‖Σk‖ :=
(
b−a
k
)n
. Denote by σkj , 1 ≤ j ≤ k
n, be the elements of Σk and let
‖Σk‖
kn∑
i=1
φ(θkj , fk(θ
k
j ),∇fk(θ
k
j ))
be the corresponding Riemann sum approximating
∫
Θ φ(x, fk(θ),∇fk(θ))dθ, where θ
k
j ∈ σ
k
j and
σkj ∈ Σk. Then for any ǫ > 0 there is K ∈ N such that∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Θ
φ(θ, fk(θ),∇fk(θ))dθ − ‖Σk‖
kn∑
i=1
φ(θkj , fk(θ
k
j ),∇fk(θ
k
j ))
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ (19)
for any k ≥ K.
Proof. By lemma A.6, for each fk there exists a sequence of continuously differentiable convex
functions {gkj } such that
gkj → fk uniformly.
Let hk be the first element in {g
k
j } such that ‖hk − fk‖ ≤
1
k and ‖∇hk(θ) − ∇fk(θ)‖ ≤
1
k for
all θ ∈ Θ where ∇fk is continuous. Then hk → f uniformly, and by Lemma A.5 we have that
∇hk(θ) → ∇f(θ) a.e. It follows from Egoroff’s theorem that for every n ∈ N there exists a set
Λn ⊂ Θ such that:
µ(Θ \ Λn) < 1/n and ∇hk → ∇f uniformly on Λn.
Let X σkj
(·) be the indicator function of σkj and define
gk(θ) := φ(θ, hk(θ),∇kk(θ))−
kn∑
j=1
X σkj
(θ)φ(θkj , hk(θ
k
j ),∇hk(θ
k
j ))
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Fix n, consider θ0 ∈ Λn and let {θ
k
0} be the sequence of θ
k
j ’s converging to θ0 as the partition is
refined. By uniform convergence, ∇f is continuous on Λn, hence
lim
k→∞
hk(θ
k
0) = f(θ0) and lim
k→∞
∇hk(θ
k
0) = ∇f(θ0) (20)
It follows from (20) and the continuity of φ that gk → 0 almost everywhere on Λn. Notice that as
a consequence of the compactness of Θ and Q and the definition of hk we have
‖φ(θ, fk(θ),∇fk(θ))‖ ≤ K1, for al θ ∈ Θ and some K1 > 0.
and ∣∣∣∣∣∣gk(θ)−

φ(θ, fk(θ),∇fk(θ))− k
n∑
j=1
X σkj
(θ)φ(θkj , fk(θ
k
j ),∇fk(θ
k
j ))


∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
K2
k
for some K2 > 0 and all θ ∈ Θ where ∇fk is continuous. Therefore∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Θ
φ(θ, fk(θ),∇fk(θ))dθ − ‖σ
k
j ‖
kn∑
i=1
φ(θkj , fk(θ
k
j ),∇fk(θ
k
j ))
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ K2‖Θ‖k +
∣∣∣∣
∫
Θ
gk(θ)dθ
∣∣∣∣ (21)
By Lebesgue Dominated Convergence
lim
k→∞
∫
Λn
gk(θ)dθ = 0,
moreover, the definition of Λn implies∫
Θ\Λn
gk(θ)dθ ≤
2K1
n
.
Given ǫ > 0 take n ∈ N such that 2K1n ≤
ǫ
2 and K such that
K2‖Θ‖
K
+
∣∣∣∣
∫
Λn
gK(θ)dθ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ2 .
Then equation (19) holds for all k ≥ K. ✷
B MatLab code for the examples in section 4
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